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General as surprise may be, it is not necessarily uniform. Everybody was surprised, to say the least, when at the end of February, 1997,
newspapers all over the world carried the photo of a sheep called Dolly_
Many biologists gave interviews, stressi ng their surprise, among them
Lee Segal, professor of biology at Princeton. Hi s surprise had, however,
something special to it. Word about Dolly prompted him not to send to
the publisher the manuscript of his new book on biology. The reason
for thi s was that the manuscript contai ned his emphat ic assertion that
the cloning of higher animals was impossible.
Such, at least, was the account in The New York Times, whi ch, as
in many other cases too, was not ent irely correct. As I learned from
Professor Segal's secretary, he referred only to a text still under reworking. Regardless of this, there is no doubt that he voiced the conviction
of the great majority of biologists about the impossibility of cloning
hi gher animals, and certai nly any individual of the species known as
man.
Biologists knew what they were saying. They had a long series of
failures ever since 1938 when Hans Spemann proposed what he called
a "fantastic experiment." The experiment, or cloning, seemed 10 belong
to the world of fantasy. In 1952 an experiment using cells from
February, 1998

5

embryos of frogs failed almost at the start. In 1970 the same experiment
succeeded only to the point of producing tadpoles. In 1981 two
scientists claimed to have cloned a mouse, again using an embryo cell,
but the next year two scientists reported that the experiment could not
be duplicated. Several other scientists reported similar failures.
The situation did not change essentially when in 1994 Neal First
tried to clone calves from embryos but was unable to push the division
of cells beyond 128. Two years later the division of cells was pushed
incredibly further, as demonstrated by the photos of Dolly.
Ian Wilmut, of the Rosslin Institute in Scotland, who produced
Dolly, did so by taking a cell from the udder of an adult sheep, but
unlike Dr. First, he put it into a donnant state, before transferring its
nucleus into the egg cell of another sheep from which the nucleus had
been removed. Wilmut's success had, however, been preceded by 277
failures.

Cause of Success Unknown
Even now it is not fully known why Dr. Wilmut succeeded.
Biologists believe that shortly after the fertilized ovum begins to
differentiate into cells, most of its 100,000 genes shut off. Only those
genes remain active that are needed to let the various cells perfonn their
special function, that is, whether to produce hair, skin, bone, muscle,
blood and so forth.
It seems that by making a cell dormant, or almost inert, the mechanism which turns off the activities of most genes in the cell is neutralized. Such a cell is then placed into an unfertilized sheep egg cell from
which its own genetic material has been removed. The fusion of the two
cells makes the egg cell "think" that it has been fertilized. Then, so the
theory goes, the chemical machinery of the egg cell activates the
mammary cell genes into starting aJl over again, as if the two cells had
been brought together for the first time as sperm and ovwn. So much
about the fact of cloning not only some low-grade living organisms, but
a mammaJ , an organism close to the organism known as man.
This shows at least that in science it is very risky to claim that
something is impossible. The history of science is full of refutation of
such claims. Until Wohler produced synthetic urea in 1828, it had been
generally believed that it was not possible to produce organic material
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from inorganic. It is well to recall that the American astronomer
Samuel Newcomb said aroWld 1895 that engine-powered fl ying was a
physical impossibility. In 1934, Rutherford declared that talk about the
industrial utilization of nuclear energy was moonshine. In 1950
Vannevar Bush, the captain of American technology during World War
1I, insisted that it was impossible to construct intercontinental ballistic
mi ssiles.
But once Columbus crossed the Atlantic, many other ships
followed. The cloning o f sheep will be followed by the cloning of other
animals. There wi ll be many failures. Immediately after Dolly was
unvei led, Dr. First at the University of Wisconsin attempted the
cloning of a cow. The cloned cell died after it grew to 16 cells. It should
have grown to 60-120 cells before it could have been transplanted into
the uterus of another cow. Another biologist, Dr. Eyestone, produced
embryos of cloned cows that survived)O to 40 days. Still others started
experimenting with pigs, because pigs' organs seem to be particularly
useful for transplants in hwnans. And two scientists in Oregon reported
that they had successfully cloned rhesus monkeys, which of all animals
are genetically the closest to man .
In all these efforts much will be learned that will prove very useful
in the eventual cloning of a hwnan. I feci it in my bones that the cloning
of humans is already being attempted in various laboratories, even in
countries where law forbids the cloning of man. And since there is no
such law yet in the USA, biologists eager to be first with the cloning of
man can take comfort from the fact that a new law is usually not
retroactive.
So the race is on, in line w ith a basic feature of the scientific
enterpri se. Instead o f a feature I should perhaps speak. of a blot. The
blot is the insatiable hunger for glory. In that respect scientists are c10sc
second to politicians, those proverbial victims of the illusion that glory
somehow makes one immortal. Had such a hunger for glory not been
at play, there would not have been a breakneck race to be the first with
the discovery of the double helix structure of DNA. Simultaneous
discoveries, ever more frequent in sc ience, witness that hunger for a
glory which goes only to the one who first crosses the fini sh line.
Worse, the glory to be the first is often coupled with huge financial
rewards. At any rate, ethical concerns hardly ever proved to be a barrier
to slowi ng down research, let alo ne stopping it. Thus Oppenheimer
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defended the making of the atom bomb with the following remark: "It
is my judgment in these things that when you see something that is
technicaJly sweet. you go ahead and do it and you argue about what to
do about it only after you have had your technical success." John von
Neumann was hardly an unethical man. Born and raised as a Catholic
he died as a Catholic. But as a scientist he knew full well what may be
best called the "technological imperative." He knew, to quote his
words, that "technological possibilities are irresistible to man. If man
can go to the moon, he will. Ifhe can control the climate, he will."
And this is precisely what a historian of technology said with an
eye on cloning. One may disagree with his generalization that the
history of science is the story of the domination of science by technology. But without doubt it has happened all too often that an available
new technology has established " its own definitions and boundaries
over settled human societies and ordered human perceptions." Another
historian of science, Danicl Kevles, who at Caltech directs the Program
of Science, Ethics and Public Policy, argued on behalf of cloning on a
distinctly pragmatic basis, regardless of hi s havi ng claimed the moral
high ground: " As with so many previous advances in biology. today's
aITront to the gods may be tomorrow's highly regarded- and highly
demanded- agent of self-gratification or health."
But biotechnology is bound to develop far beyond the point of
mere cloning where the DNA in the chromosomes is not touched at all.
Beyond merely duplicating the chromosomes, there lies the prospect of
altering the DNA and thereby altering the organism itself. On hearing
about Wilmut's success, James Watson, the co-discoverer of the double
helix structure of DNA, quipped that cloning could have already been
done in 1938. He also referred to an article of his published in 1971 in
Allantic Monthly. with the title, " Moving Toward the Clonal Man," in
which he meant more than cloning. He meant that new age of abso lute
biotechnology in which as he put it, two years ago in Princeton, only
one kind of knowledge is necessary and useful , the science of genes.
Watson is clearly looking forward to a future where the DNA of
individuals would be manipulated and with even less moral concern
than the concern sparked by the mere cloning of humans. His confidence is certainly supported by the tenor of argwnents that followed the
possibilities opened up with the presentation of Dolly. Too many of the
sc ienti sts with expertise in cloning displayed indeed an alanning lack
8
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of concern for considerations that are ethical in the sense of being more
than mere pragmatic guidelines.
They can take great comfort from the fact that no one would
dispute the feasibility of cloning humans. No less comfort can they take
from what is the gist of that document which is a most representative
summary of the arguments for or against the cloning. The document is
the I07-page-long final form of the Report which the 18-member
National Bioethics Advisory Commission presented on June 14 to
President Clinton, and it has a thrust that was aptly rendered in the
remark, which Dr. Harold Shapiro, President of Princeton University
and Chairman of the Commission, made on that occasion: "We all
understand there are moral views that many of us have, which we do
not want to translate into law out of respect for those who have totally
different views. We are very sensitive to that issue."
This amounted to a dichotomy between morality and legality,
which deprived legality of being intrinsically ethical and debased
morality to the level of sheer pragmatism. This is not to say that all
members of the Commission were willing to countenance that
dichotomy. Some, who were very much in the minority, kept emphasizing "the sanctity oflife and traditional human values," and insisted that
cloning was radically different, say, from in vitro fertilization. Their
view had to appear "extreme," if set ofT against the view of those who
invoked this country's "strong tradition of not preventing scientific
research and not intervening in people's right to reproduce."
Majority Waffling
The majority of the commission felt confident, however, that it was
possible to stake out a " moral" ground between those two extremes.
But their very central recommendation flew in the face of this contention of theirs. For they recommended nothing more than that the
cloning of humans be prohibited by law, though only for three to five
years, and this prohibition be extended only if a further review of the
matter would vouch for such a step. Clearly, these middle-grounders
had no genuine ethical objection to the eventual cloning of humans.
Indeed they could not brand as unethical the action of those who, in
spite ofa law, would go ahead with the cloning of humans. Convinced
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as he was that there would be some such scientists, Dr. Shapiro could
only brand their action as "unfortunate," but not "unethical."
In fact, one member of the Commission, Dr. Bernard Lo, Director
of the Program in Medical Ethics at the University of California at San
Francisco, admitted that physicians working at I.V.F. (in vitro fertility)
flatl y ignored the Commission's invitation to discuss matters. They
were not, of course, encumbered by problems of publicity and possible
damage suits, unlike the biomedical industry that took up the invitation.
It also turned out that the Commission itself began to move toward
considering a legislative ban only after Laurie Flynn expressed her utter
befuddlement with the arguments: " I have not really understood why
we would want to, in my view, kind of fail the common man test." This
was a reminder to the rest of the Commission that its function was not
a purely academic exercise, but pan of the broader political process
within which any common man counted as much as any single
academic. The ethical perspective loomed menacingly large in the
wings, but still could not be admitted to the stage where the arguments
went back and forth .
Very telling aspects of the true character of those arguments,
especially the ones set forth by the middle-grounders became public
when. a month or so earlier, preliminary conclusions of the Commission became public knowledge. Not once, however, was it disputed that
the combination of money and scientific expertise can be used for doing
the most repul sive things. Prof. First had such a combination in mind
when he said in reference to a wealthy person who perhaps wanted to
be cloned: "A private clinic could be set up and clone that person just
as nice as could be. There are no rules or restrictions preventing it."
Please, note that he found nothing repulsive in the combination of the
desires of a wealthy man to duplicate himself and in the eagerness of
the sc ientist to cooperate to perform that cloning.
Those who know something about the dark side of human nature
will not be shocked. The phrase, "nothing surprises me any more," has
never been more appropriatc to use. But there is something even more
shocking and in a sense surprising in the rest of Prof. First's comments.
Prof. First. a member of the National Advisory Board on Ethics in
Reproduction. reported that the Board found no merit in cloning for
human society. The phrase " found no merit" is worth noting. It can
have various meanings, such as undemonstrated. unjustified, useless,
\0
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trivial and so forth. But it never carries the meaning: it is repulsive,
abhorrent, ethically wrong, let alone "gravely sinful."
Belief in Revealed God
In all the arguing that goes on about the cloning of humans, only
those brand the cloning of humans as something abhorrent, repulsi ve,
or gravely unethical, that is, sinful , who believe in a persona1 God. And
not merely in a persona1 God, but in a God who revealed Himself. They
are either Orthodox Jews, or non-liberal Christians, or Muslims.
However, all these, when they participate in public arguments about the
ethical nature of the cloning of humans, are not supposed to refer to
their religious beliefs.
To some extent this restriction is reasonable as the arguing about
cloning humans takes place within a societal framework where many
do not share religious views whatsoever. Even greater is the number of
those who hold themselves religious without believing in some specific
religious revelation. Examples are liberal Protestants and liberal Jews.
Further, belief in religious revelation does not issue in a consensus
about human nature. Orthodox Jews are hardly explicit about a human
soul, which is the touchstone of truth for Catholics in arguing on purely
rational grounds about the specific dignity of human nature. Traditional
Protestants have kept thei r erstwhile diffidence about _philosophical
arguments. Moreover, Catholics for the most part fail to note that those
purely rational arguments, are, for all their validity, rather ineffective
when severed from the great historical facts of Revelation.
Those arguments are epistemological and metaphysical. They rest
on considerations about language, symbol making, concept fonnation,
about universals, about the reality of free will , about the sense of
enduring self-identity, about consciousness, about existence statements,
about search for explanation of what is spec ific in things, and ultimately about their totality, the universe. Then there are ethical
considerations, such as the sense of a distinction between what is
morally good and what is evil, considerations about a need for ultimate
justice, so conspicuously missing in this world of tragic inequalities and
injustices . Only if man has an immortal soul , with eternal retribution
for good or evil, can he look at the word justice as more than a mere
word, good as long as one is not victimized. One can further point out
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that without accepting a genuine uniqueness of man, it is not possible
to defend democracy itself or to pass judgment on totalitarian regimes,
including the Nazis and deplore, say the Holocaust as an unconditional,
absolute moral evil.
The reason for thi s lies with pragmatism, which remains the only
recourse for those who have rejected traditional Western thought. Yet
on the basis of pragmatism one cannot argue that the Nazi atrocities
constituted an absolute moral crime against humanity. Nor does
pragmatism provide a strict argument for condemning the extermination of six million kulaks and of another 14 million other victims of
Stalin. Pragmatism has nothing convincing to offer in the way of
condemning unconditionally the extermination of some 20 million,
which Mao's Cultural Revolution found pragmatically necessary for its
own purposes. Such and other relatively lesser crimes committed
against humanity, say, by Pol Pot, Mobutu, and others can be condemned in a genuinely ethical tribunal only if there is a human nature,
essentially different from mere animal nature.
The foregoing arguments will not cut ice even with those who
profess noble versions of pragmatism. Further, the thinking of more
than half of the members of the Board appears to be dominated by a
consideration that is nobly pragmatic only on the surface. Beneath that
surface there lie various " religious" ideologies, such as secularism,
scientific materialism, evolutionary wisdom, agnosticism and so forth.
All these find a marvelous cover-up in pragmatism, for which ultimately only success counts at a thorough disregard of genuinely ethical
considerations.
This was clear already when, prior to the problems raised by the
possible cloning of humans, the Board had to advise the President and
Congress on the fertilization of human eggs for the purposes of mere
research . The Board did indeed advise that this should be done. One
member of the Board, Ronald Green, professor of ethics at Dartmouth,
said that this was one of the several "very thoughtful recommendations"
made by the Board. Please, note the expression, " very thoughtful." It
represents the same evasion as the phrase already quoted, "found no
merit."
Let me cite another phrase, equally evasive, by another member of
the Board, R. Alta Charo, professor of law at the University of
Wisconsin. She recalled that when the President and Congress roundly

12

Linacre Quarterly

rejected the suggestions of the Board that human embryos be produced
for research, she learned a "valuable lesson." It taught her and other
members of the Board that ethics is not plain logic. On the one hand,
the Board "relied on logic to make its case that research with early
human embryos was ethically acceptable." About that logic she said it
was "airtight, but it did not change anybody's mind and there was a lot
of resentment." On the other hand, she and others realized that "logical
arguments are only rationalizations for gut feelings or religious
viewpoints." Then she concluded: "I don't think we can make good
suggestions unless we can understand what is compelling for the
public."
The phrase "compelling for the public" is another illustration of the
verbal technique for evading truth, ethical truth. Modern society. or the
public, is ever more ready to modify what it finds compelling to oppose
or not to oppose. Fifty years ago modern society found it compelling to
reject abortion as unethical. Today at least half of Western society finds
it compelling to approve abortion, another fourth of that society finds
it compelling to compromise, and no more than a fourth, if that many
at all, would find it compelling to reject abortion as something
intrinsically Wlethical. Therefore as long as society finds it compelling
to approve of abortion it has no logical ground s to oppose the produc·
tion ofhwnan embryos for experimentation. Prof. Charo was therefore
logical, but not entirely. She failed to see that there can be much logic
in at least some of those "gut feelings and religious viewpoints." Those
who claim dignity only when it suits them, fail to see logic in the
arguments against the cloning of humans.

Recommendations of the Board
For when no logic is seen in "gut feelings and religious view·
points," the door opens wide to a purely pragmatic approach, such as
the Board's final recommendation of a temporary moratorium. In other
words, attention was focused on the fact that in Wilmut's case one
successful healthy clone implied several dozen sheep fetuses with
severe malfunctions. The moratorium on cloning humans was to last
until the technology of cloning developed to the point where hardly a
single human fetus with severe malfunctions would be produced by
cloning.
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Within five years, so went the final recommendation of the Board,
public revulsion would abate and the pragmatic success of cloning
would make compelling the cloning of humans. Such an argumentation
means that the ethical merit of cloning humans is merely the function
of the measure of technological success, or perhaps of the effectiveness
of molding public opinion by holding high that success. Such a
brainwashing can easily be accomplished in a society which puts so
high a premium on success of any kind. This worship of success is not
absent in the Christian, and not even in the Catholic, segment of
society.
Members of the Board admitted that cloning in private clinics not
subsidized by Federal money could be stopped onJy by a Federal law.
But even if such a law were enacted, it should be abrogated, they said,
once the technology of cloning became a safe procedure. One member
of the committee, Dr. Bernard Lo, admitted that "there is no easy way
to dismiss the religious, almost mythical argument that it [the cloning
of humans] was deeply objectionable, an affront to human dignity."
This could be true only if Dr. Lo and the great majority of the Board
had a non-easy, that is, hard or difficult or complex way to dismiss that
argument. But what was that difficult way of arguing? It consisted in a
grim resolve to fall back on pragmatism. But a grim resolve is not an
argument, let alone a hard-won argument. Instead of demonstrating that
there was no "compelling reason" why cloning should be banned, Dr.
Lo merely reaffinned that was no such reason.
Other members of the Board interviewed in The New York Times
were even more open in saying that the ethical issue about cloning
ceased in the measure in which the science of cloning was perfected.
Thus Dr. Retaugh Graves Dumas, vice provost for health affairs at the
University of Michigan, put forward the following " moral argument"
on behalf of cloning: " It is immoral not to have access to the best
technology we could muster. It would be a shame to prohibit cloning
forever." In other words, pragmatism makes it possible to reverse
totally the role of those who should feel ashamed and those who should
not. And why? Because there are no "compelling arguments."
The phrase "compelling arguments" is simply a device to avoid the
task of arguing in all earnestness. But it also shows that arguments are
much more than sheer logic. Logic, which is about various degrees of
identity relations among concepts, cannot even assure man that there is
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plain external reality in front of him. For the phrase," I know that a
table is there", does not establish a logical identity between the mind
and the table. Yet the assertion of the reality of the table remains fully
rational.
Nothing of such elementary facets of the mind in face with reality
are in view in the argumentation of those who will be mostly listened
to by the political authorities who must decide whether to make or not
to make it a legal offense to clone humans. Those authorities. I mean
the legislators and other elected officials, are a representative crosssection of society. And since much of society's thinking is pragmatic,
society and its elected representatives will follow the line of pragmatism, which is to gratify self-satisfaction and mere bodily health.

Legal Taken for Ethical
Society now largely takes the view that what is legal is also ethical.
And ultimately what is legal is decided by the Courts. Now to speak of
the USA alone, there the Supreme Court ruled in 1980 that patenting
genetically created life was legal. Therefore, long before cloning had
become an ethical issue for scientific technology, the Court made a
ruling which implied that cloning, too, would be considered legal and
therefore ethical.
The cloning of humans can and will become legal, but unless
morality is equal to legality, it will not become ethical. For unless there
is in man more than matter, there is no valid ethics, but only rules of
convenience. If the Vatican declared, already in 1984, the cloning of
humans to be gravely unethical , it is only because Rome stands for that
Christian view that man has a soul that no scalpel or microtome can
touch.
Indeed, in that view even a cloned human being will have a soul.
Outwardly that being may not be more than an identical twin, but it has
an individual soul different from the soul of the other twin. Therefore
such a cloned human being should be treated by society in a truly
human way. But the question is whether by the time-perhaps within
another generation- there are cloned humans ready to go to school in
significant numbers, society sti ll will be sufficiently human. For if the
present is already very chaotic from the ethical viewpoint, incredibly
more chaotic will be that not too distant future where thejuggemaut of
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biotechnology will be roaming freely. "Nothing suggests," that
historian of technology said, ..that the President or Congress has the
power-<>r ultimately the will- to defy that relentless juggernaut. It
will be a chaotic future. Better get used to it."
It is certain that mere pragmatism is not a preparation for getting
used to that future. Pragmatism has no compelling reasons except to be
pragmatic about reasoning. For compelling reasons we must tum elsewhere, indeed to the very source that created in the Western world a
consensus about compelling reasons, a consensus which has for some
time been eroding and whose last pillars are now being disassembled
by the latest versions of the oracles of Delphi. I mean the new breed of
academics, ca1led ethicists, with high visibility in universities, medical
schools and hospitals. Like the oracles of Delphi, they are past masters
in evasiveness.
We have come a long way from that supreme Master of ethics, who
once warned: "Let your yes be yes and your no be no. " But Jesus is to
be recalled for another reason as well, which is implied in my repeated
references to "compelling reasons." For in his dramatic account of the
banquet in the Kingdom of God, to which the invited refuse to come,
he says that all those who are found in the highways and along the
hedgerows must be compelled to come in (Lk 15:23).
This compulsion is simply evangelization. It has been done mainly
by virtue of its being intrinsically compelling, though because of
historical circumstances it also took the form of external compulsion.
Messengers of evangelization can only rejoice that long gone are the
times when people could be driven to the baptismal font. But
evangelization as a relentless presentation of compelling reasons will
go on. For there will always be such who hear in their soul the echo of
Paul's words: "Woe to me, if I do not evangelize."
Would that s uch souls were very numerous and properly intelligent
whenever they have to descend into the arena of mere reason . There
they cannot refer to some facts of hi story, which, like facts in general,
have a greater persuasiveness than abstract reasoning, however valid.
They must articulate those arguments with consummate philosophical
skill. This demands far more than a recourse to some choice phrase,
such as Flynn's reference to "the common man test." But in articulating
those arguments they must not forget that the strength which they see
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in them derives from their own openness to certain facts of history,
salvation history, that is.
They cannot assume this strength to operate in their opponents in
the cloning debate. Actually, a very different strength is at work in their
opponents in the cloning debate as they present their own arguments.
They are evangelizers in their own way, though very careful not to
make it appear so. Here, too, they resort to words artfully left in
vagueness. A case in point is the letter which the Commission sent to
the President together with the Report. There, a covert appeal was made
to a need for evangelization, though under the cover of further need for
education, the specifics of which anyone could interpret according to
his or her ideology. According to the letter, the members of the
Commission "feel quite strongly that most of the legal and moral issues
raised can only be resolved, even temporarily, by a great deal more
widespread deliberation and education."
Rightly so. The question is, what kind of education should prevail?
There is an education steeped in genuine Chri stian faith, which, let it
be recalled ought to be always supported with fully rational argument.
Did not Saint Paul warn in Romans (12:1) that Christian faith should
be a rational service? Then there is an education within which phrases,
such as President Clinton's affinnation of "the miracle of human life
and the God-given individuality of each person", become hollow in the
measure in which the credibility of those voicing such phrases is no
longer marketable. And there is an education by militant secular
humanism, viewing gleefully the juggernaut of biotechnology. The
crudely pragmatic future it wants to bring about will be contained only
in the measure in which men and women are exposed to compelling
reasons about Jesus Christ. Public arguments about cloning are already
sidetracked into the blind alley of pragmatism. The only hope lies with
a re-evangelization of Christians, and especially of Catholics, with the
help of a catechism that will not ask them to reinvent eternal truths.
These truths, revealed truths, cannot readily penetrate adult minds
that prefer arguments to the love of truth, in order to evade Truth writ
large. Those truths have been available now for many generations in
forms that can readily be put even in the mouths of babes. They, by
nature, know that unless one becomes as receptive as a child, one shall
not enter the Kingdom of God. Thi s kingdom is the only alternative to
the kingdom of academic and societal sophistication where "compelling
February, 1998
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reasons" mean a heavy reliance on conveniently glib phrases that most
do not dare to probe into. They don't dare because their conviction
largely consists in the conviction that one need not be convinced about
anything.
The cloning of humans will come, it may already be under way,
and will go on. Arguments in support of cloning need not be strong as
long as they are supported by a strong downward stream towards
societal lowlands where pennissiveness is the sole ethical nOnTI.
Arguments against cloning need not be directed at the champions of
cloning, not even at the many muddle-headed middle-grounders, who
often remind one of goats put in charge of the cabbage field. Arguments
against cloning should benefit only those, who mostly because of their
faith in higher realities, would recoil at the prospect of failing the test
of the common man, who is the only everlasting man that cannot be
cloned but only created. Their recoil or rather revulsion becomes truly
human only when fully rational too, that is, fully equipped with the art
of arguing.

18

Linacre Quarterly

